COURTS AND PROCEDURE-LONG ARM JURISDICTION-NEW
JERSEY ADOPTS

STREAM-OF-COMMERCE THEORY FOR ESTABLISHING PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A FOREIGN MANUFAC-

TURER-Charles Gendler & Co., Inc. v. Telecom Equipment Corp.,
102 NJ. 460, 508 A.2d 1127 (1986).
In order for a court to adjudicate a particular case, it must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as personal jurisdiction over the specific parties to the dispute.' The scope of a
state's jurisdiction over a party is defined by the United States
Constitution 2 and the long-arm statutes enacted by the individual
states." Historically, a state's authority to assert personal jurisdiction focused on the presence of persons and property within
its boundaries. 4 As interstate commerce and communication expanded, 5 however, more recent law has focused on "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation" in
asserting personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. 6
The United States Supreme Court has continued this trend
by applying the stream-of-commerce theory as a method for asserting personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer. 7 This
theory states that a foreign manufacturer is subject "to jurisdiction whenever its products are deliberately marketed into the
'stream of commerce' notwithstanding the presence of independI J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.1, at 96-7
(1985) [hereinafter FRIEDENTHAL]. Subject matter jurisdiction "refers to [a] court's
competence to hear and determine cases of the general class to which proceedings
in question belong; the power to deal with the general subject involved in the action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1278 (5th ed. 1979) (citation omitted). Personal
jurisdiction is the "power of a court over the person of a defendant in contrast to
the jurisdiction of a court over a defendant's property or his interest therein.
Id. at 1030.
2 The fourteenth amendment states in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 FREIDENTHAL, supra note 1, § 3.1, at 96-7.
4 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
5 Ripple & Murphy, IVorld-llWide Volkswagen Corporation v. Tl'oodson: Reflections oni
the Road Ahead, 56 NOTRE DAME L.REv. 65, 70 (1980).
6 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
7 Charles Gendler & Co., Inc. v. Nippon Elec. Co., Ltd., 199 N.J. Super. 227,
235, 488 A.2d 1091, 1095 (App. Div. 1985), rev'd and remanded sub uora. Charles
Gendler & Co., Inc. v. Telecom Equip. Corp., 102 N.J 460, 508 A.2d 1127 (1986).
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ent corporations in the chain of distribution." '8 Although both
the Appellate Division and Law Division of the Superior Court of
New Jersey had previously employed the "stream-of-commerce"
theory, 9 this principle was only recently analyzed and adopted by
the Supreme Court of New Jersey.'" In Charles Gendler & Co., Inc.
v. Telecom Equipment Corp.," the supreme court held that the

stream-of-commerce theory would apply as a basis supporting
personal jurisdiction
over foreign manufacturers and non-resi2
dent defendants.'

Charles Gendler & Co. (Gendler), a New York corporation,
purchased a telephone system for installation at its Belleville,
New Jersey premises in April of 1979 from Telecom Equipment
Corporation (Telecom).' 3 The system was manufactured by Nippon Electric Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a Japanese corporation.' 4
Although Nippon is not authorized to conduct business in New
Jersey, its wholly-owned subsidiaries, NEC America, Inc. (NEC
America) and NEC Telephones, Inc. (NEC Telephones), both
New York corporations, act respectively as the importer and distributor of Nippon products.' 5 NEC Telephones sold the telephone system to Telecom who in turn sold and installed the
system for Gendler. 6 Following the installation of the telephone
system, Gendler paid Telecom the amount due. 1 7 Immediately
thereafter, Gendler encountered technical problems with the system, contending it was plagued with defects and was totally
8

Id.

9 See Coons v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 176 N.J. Super. 575, 424 A.2d 466 (App.
Div. 1980), vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 996 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 94 N.J.
307, 463 A.2d 921 (1983), modified, 96 N.J. 419, 476 A.2d 763 (1984), cert. denied,
105 S.Ct. 808 (1985); Certisimo v. Heidelberg Co., 122 N.J. Super. 1, 298 A.2d 298
(Law Div. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Van Eeuwen v. Heidelberg Eastern Inc., 124 N.J.
Super. 251, 306 A.2d 79 (App. Div. 1973).
10 See Charles Gendler & Co., Inc. v. Telecom Equip. Corp., 102 N.J. 460, 477,
508 A.2d 1127, 1136 (1986).
11 Id. at 460, 508 A.2d at 1127.
12 Id. at 477, 508 A.2d at 1136.
13 Id. at 467, 508 A.2d at 1130.
14 Gendler, 199 N.J. Super. at 229, 488 A.2d at 1092. Nippon's principal place of
business is in Tokyo, Japan. Gendler, 102 N.J. at 467, 508 A.2d at 1130.
15 Gendler, 102 N.J. at 467, 508 A.2d at 1130.
16 Id. Nippon admitted that the sale to Gendler was not an isolated transaction
and that various other Nippon products "may have been sold in New Jersey." Id.
17 Brief and Appendix of Plaintiff-Appellant at Pal, Charles Gendler & Co., Inc.
v. Nippon Elec. Co., Ltd., 199 N.J. Super. 227, 488 A.2d1091 (App. Div. 1985),
rev'd and remanded sub nona. Charles Gendler & Co., Inc. v. Telecom Equipment
Corp., 102 N.J. 460, 508 A.2d 1127 (1986) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief]. The
system was installed in June 1979, at which time the balance on the $8,023
purchase price, excluding taxes, was paid. Id.
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inoperable. "
In their purchase agreement with Gendler, "Telecom warranted 'the Equipment against defective parts of [sic] workmanship for a period of one year from the date of its installation. "'"19
Telecom responded to Gendler's complaints regarding the system's improper performance by extending the post installation
warranty.2 0 Nevertheless, the problems with the telephone system persisted and Gendler commenced suit against Telecom and
Nippon alleging breach of warranty. 2 1 Telecom and Nippon
both received service of process; however, only Nippon contested jurisdiction.2 2 In answering the complaint against it, Nippon contended that it did not have sufficient business contacts
for New Jersey courts to assert personal jurisdiction. 2' The law
division held for Nippon, thereby granting their motion to
2 4
dismiss.

The appellate division, however, utilized the stream-of-commerce theory as espoused in earlier federal and New Jersey cases
and reversed the lower court's ruling. 25 According to this theory,
18 Id. at 1. The plaintiff-appellant claimed the "equipment was defective, unmerchantable and unfit for the ordinary uses and purposes for which it was intended, namely telephonic communication." Id.
19 Gendler, 102 N.J. at 467, 508 A.2d at 1130. The contract additionally stated
that resolution of any conflicts which may arise under the contract would be decided under the law of New York. Id.
20 Gendler, 199 N.J. Super. at 230, 488 A.2d at 1092.
21 Id. The plaintiff's complaint alleged "breach by both Nippon and Telecom,
of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for the ordinary purposes and
uses for which the telephone system was intended." See Appellant's Brief, supra

note 17, at 2.
22 See Gendler, 102 N.J. at 467, 508 A.2d at 1130.
23 See Gendler, 199 N.J. Super. at 229, 488 A.2d at 1092. Nippon claimed that it
did not solicit business or retain a sales force in the state. See Gendler, 102 N.J. at
468, 508 A.2d at 1131. In opposition to Nippon's motion, Gendler "asserted that
Nippon had under the relevant New Jersey and United States Supreme Court judicial precedents, exhibited sufficient 'minimum contacts' with the New Jersey forum
See Appellant's
..
Brief, supra note 17, at 3.
24 Gendler, 102 N.J. at 467, 508 A.2d at 1130. In rendering her decision, Judge
Loftus stated: "[t]he mere assertion or citation.. .that Nippon manufactures a telephone system for sale throughout the world, without any further authority or facts
supporting any direct flow into the State of New Jersey, is not enough to hold that
this Court has in personam jurisdiction over the defendant Nippon." Appellant's
Brief, supra note 17, at Appendix T 12/16/83 at 10-11. Furthermore, the Judge
opined that "the minimum contact test is not satisfied simply because a product
seems to come to rest in the forum state." Id. at T 12/16/83 at 13. After Judge
Loftus' decision, Telecom settled with Gendler. See Appellant's Brief, supra note
17, at Appendix Pa34.
25 See Gendler, 199 N.J. Super. at 239-40, 488 A.2d at 1097-98. See also Coons v.
Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 176 N.J. Super. 575, 424 A.2d 466 (App. Div. 1980), i'acated and remanded, 455 U.S. 996 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 94 N.J. 307, 463 A.2d
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a foreign manufacturer would be subject to the court's jurisdiction whenever its products are deliberately placed into the market even though there may be independent corporations in the
distribution chain. 2 6 The appellate division found that the existence of Nippon's products in New Jersey was not fortuitous, but
in fact was the result of a deliberate marketing program executed
through its wholly-owned subsidiaries.2 7 The appellate division
ruled, therefore, that "Nippon could reasonably anticipate being
involved in litigation" in NewJersey.28 Thus, marketing its products through subsidiaries would not insulate Nippon from personal jurisdiction. 2'
Nippon appealed the decision and
certification was granted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. °
921 (1983), modified, 96 N.J. 419, 476 A.2d 763 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 808
(1985); Certisimo v. Heidelberg Co., 122 N.J. Super. 1, 298 A.2d 298 (Law Div.
1972), aff'd sub nom. Van Eeuwen v. Heidelberg Eastern Inc., 124 N.J. Super. 251,
306 A.2d 79 (App. Div. 1973).
26 Gendler, 199 N.J. Super. at 235, 488 A.2d at 1095.
27 Id. at 240, 488 A.2d at 1098. The court noted that "[t]he subsidiaries are the
merchandising tools, if not the tentacles of their commercial parent." Id. at 230,
488 A.2d at 1092.
28 Id. at 240, 488 A.2d at 1098.
29 Id. In arriving at its decision, the appellate division relied on seven factors:
(1) while the extent of Nippon's interjection of activities into New Jersey

has not been established, it sent an alleged defective product into the
world market with knowledge that harm could occur wherever the defect
was manifest; (2) while Nippon's burden in defending an action in New
Jersey is significant, plaintiff's burden in suing Nippon in Japan exceeds
that of Nippon in defending in NewJersey; (3) NewJersey has a compelling interest in regulating the conduct of manufacturers who send alleged defective products into New Jersey; (4) Nippon has shown no
conflict with any foreign interests of Japan sufficient to outweigh New
Jersey's interest in litigating plaintiff's claim; (5) New Jersey appears to
be the most efficient forum to resolve the dispute. The evidence must
be produced in New Jersey and the witnesses undoubtedly reside here
or in the vicinity. New Jersey law would be likely to control; (6) availability of the New Jersey forum is important to plaintiff's chances for convenient and effective relief, and (7) while a Japanese forum may be
available, it does not represent a practical alternative to plaintiff.
Id. at 239-40, 488 A.2d at 1097-98 (citation omitted).
The court also noted that Gendler had "served the summons and complaint on
Nippon by certified mail addressed to Nippon's subsidiary, NEC Telephones, in
Melville, New York." Id. at 229, 488 A.2d at 1092. Although this method of service
on the parent corporation is insufficient, the court concluded that this would not be
a basis upon which to dismiss the complaint. Id. at 240-41, 488 A.2d at 1098. The
appellate division held therefore that Gendler's complaint against Nippon be reinstated upon proper service of process in accordance with New Jersey law. Id. at
241, 488 A.2d at 1098. Interestingly, the trial judge did not address this issue. See
id. at 240, 488 A.2d at 1098.
30 Charles Gendler & Co., Inc. v. Nippon Elec. Co., Ltd., 102 N.J. 318, 508 A.2d
200 (1985).
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The court adopted the stream-of-commerce theory as a valid
basis for New Jersey courts to assert personal jurisdiction over
foreign manufacturers that "knew or reasonably should have
known of the distribution system through which its products
were being sold in the forum state."' 3 ' The court, however, due
to the paucity of facts, 3 2 reversed the appellate division's decision
and remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether
Nippon was sufficiently aware of the distribution of its products
in New Jersey.3 3
A state's ability to assert its jurisdiction over a party is set
forth in the United States Constitution as well as its long-arm
statute.34 New Jersey's long-arm statute,3 5 for example, allows
service of process on foreign defendantsubject only to the utmost limit of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 v Guidance for determining the constitutional limits of a
state's long-arm statute has evolved from the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Pennoyer v. Neff 38 decided in 1878.
In Pennoyer, the defendant, Neff, a California resident, was
sued in Oregon for unpaid attorney fees.3 9 Upon Neff's failure
to appear for trial, the trial court attached and sold his Oregon
property to Pennoyer at a sheriff's auction.40 Neff subsequently
sought to eject Pennoyer from the property claiming that the Oregon state court's judgment was invalid in that it lacked jurisdiction over both Neff and his property. 4 In upholding Neff's
31 Gendler, 102 N.J. at 480, 508 A.2d at 1137 (citations omitted).

Id. at 483, 508 A.2d at 1139.
Id. at 483-84, 508 A.2d at 1139-40.
34 FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 1, § 3.1, at 97.
35 N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4.
36 N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4(c).
37 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 311 (1945) (addressing whether corporation is amenable to state court proceedings consistent with
"the limitations of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Gendler,
102 N.J. at 460, 508 A.2d at 1131 ("A state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction
over a defendant must comport with the due-process requirement of the fourteenth
amendment. [New Jersey's long arm statute] permits service of process on nonresident defendants 'consistent with due process of law.' ").
38 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
39 Id. at 719; see also Ripple & Murphy, supra note 5, at 69 n.33 (setting forth facts
of Pennoyer).
40 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719-20. Neff was not served personally with notice; however, pursuant to an Oregon statute notice was given solely by publication in Oregon newspapers. Id. See also Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and
the In PersonamJurisdiction of State Courts-From Penno'er to Deuckla: A Review, 25 U.
CHI. L. REV. 569, 571 (1958) (discussing Pennoyer).
41 See Pen nover, 95 U.S. at 720.
32
33
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claim, the Supreme Court ruled that each of the individual states
possesses "exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over the persons and property within its territory. '"42 Conversely, no state
would be allowed to exert its governance over persons and property lying outside its territory.4 3 Therefore, "each state would be
exclusively powerful over the persons and property inside its
borders and absolutely powerless over all persons and property
outside those borders."4 4
In InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,4 5 the Supreme Court
recognized that the jurisdictional parameters set forth in Pennoyer
did not function well given the dramatic increase in interstate
commerce throughout the twentieth century.4 6 The controversy
in InternationalShoe arose from the International Shoe Company's
unwillingness to pay unemployment compensation taxes assessed by the state of Washington.4 7 International Shoe was a
Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Missouri.4"
Although International Shoe retained no stock or merchandise in
Washington, did not maintain an office in the state, and did not
enter into contracts for merchandise there, it employed several
salesmen who were residents of Washington.4 9 The price of its
merchandise was predetermined by International Shoe and all
orders were transmitted by the salesmen to International Shoe's
headquarters.5 ° Upon assessing International Shoe for unem-

43

Id. at 722.
Id.

44

FRIEDENTHAL,

42

supra note 1, § 3.3, at 100. Specifically, the Pennoyer Court held

that:
Every State owes protection to its own citizens; and, when non-residents
deal with them, it is a legitimate and just exercise of authority to hold
and appropriate any property owned by such non-residents to satisfy the
claims of its citizens. It is in virtue of the State's jurisdiction over the
property of the non-resident situated within its limits that its tribunals
can inquire into that non-resident's obligations to its own citizens, and
the inquiry can then be carried only to the extent necessary to control
the disposition of the property. If the non-resident have [sic] no property in the State, there is nothing upon which the tribunals can
adjudicate.
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723-24.
45 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
46 See Gendler, 102 N.J. at 469, 508 A.2d at 1131.
47 InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 312.
48

Id. at 313.

Id. Moreover, International Shoe did not make deliveries through intrastate
commerce of merchandise in Washington. Id.
50 Id. at 314. Salesmen were not authorized to enter into contracts, all orders
were accepted or rejected at the Missouri headquarters, and orders were "shipped
f.o.b. from points outside Washington to the purchasers within the state." Id.
49
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ployment compensation taxes, International Shoe refused to pay,
contending that they were neither a Washington corporation nor
did they conduct business within that state.5 '
The International Shoe Court abandoned the antiquated
"presence test" articulated in Pennoyer and adopted a more flexible minimum contacts analysis. 52 The International Shoe Court
held that the principle focus in determining if a state has jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is whether the defendant has
"certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ",51 Moreover, according to the Court, minimum
contacts must be scrutinized in a manner such that the assertion
of jurisdiction is consistent with the "fair and orderly administration of the laws which
it was the purpose of the due process
54
clause to insure.

'

Since the International Shoe decision, the Supreme Court has
refined the guidelines for determining whether the minimum
contacts, fair play, and substantial justice requirements have
been met. 55 In McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co. ,56 a California resident brought suit in California against a Texas-based in57
surance company for benefits due under a life insurance policy.
The insurance company was not represented in California by any
of its agents nor did it have an office in the state. 58 The defendant, therefore, contested the California court's assertion ofjurisdiction. 59 In rendering its decision, the Supreme Court
51 Id. at 312. International Shoe contended that the unemployment compensation tax violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and imposed
an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 313. International Shoe
further contended that service of process, affected by personally serving a salesman
and by registered mail to the Missouri headquarters, was improper. Id. at 312.
52 See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 1, § 3.10, at 123-4.
53 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463 (1940)).
54 Id. at 319.
55 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-09 (1977) (determination of
minimum contacts is dependent on relationship between defendant and forum
state as well as location of defendant's property); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958) (defendant on notice that personal jurisdiction could be asserted when
"purposefully avail[ing] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws") (citation
omitted).
56 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
57 Id. at 221-22.
58 Id. at 222.
59 Id. at 224. Basing jurisdiction on the state's long-arm statute, the California
court allowed service of process by registered mail on International Life at its
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recognized the "clearly discernible" trend toward expanding a
state's jurisdiction over foreign corporations.60 Accordingly,
since the insurance contract was delivered in California, the
Court ruled that it was "sufficient for purposes of due process
that the suit was based on
a contract which had substantial con61
nection" with California.
The constitutional parameters of the "minimum contacts"
theory articulated in InternationalShoe 62 and McGee 6 3 were delineated in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 64 In World-Wide
Volkswagen, the plaintiffs, while driving from New York to Arizona, were injured in Oklahoma when their Audi automobile
burst into flames as a result of a collision.6 5 Utilizing the
Oklahoma long-arm statute, the plaintiffs brought suit against
the New York-based dealer from whom they purchased the automobile, Seaway Volkswagen, Inc., and the regional Volkswagen
Audi distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. (WorldWide) .66
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was
proper regardless of the fact that World-Wide did not sell any
cars in the state. 67 The Oklahoma court reasoned that, since
automobiles by their nature are mobile, it was foreseeable that
the defendant's products would be used in Oklahoma. 68 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court, in reversing the
Oklahoma court, reasoned that the minimum contacts requireTexas headquarters. Id. at 221. Judgment was obtained in California, and the
plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to enforce the judgment in the Texas courts. Id.
60 Id. at 222.
61 Id. at 223 (citations omitted). The Court further justified its ruling by noting
that "the premiums were mailed from [California] and the insured was a resident of
that State when he died. It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest
in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse
to pay claims." Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that while "there may be inconvenience to the insurer if it is held amenable to suit in California where it had this
contract but certainly nothing [sic] which amounts to a denial of due process." Id.
at 224 (citation omitted).
62 See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text (discussing InternationalShoe).
63 See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (discussing McGee).
64 See 444 U.S. 286, 291-94 (1980).
65 Id. at 288, 289-90.
66 Id. The plaintiffs also brought a products liability suit against the manufacturer of the car, Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, and the importer, Volkswagen of America, Inc. Id. at 288. Only World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. and
Seaway Volkswagen, Inc.-the regional distributor and automobile dealer respectively-sought review of the District Court's ruling. Id. at n.3.
67 Id. at 289-90.
68 Id. at 290.
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ments set forth in InternationalShoe and its progeny were not met
because World-Wide had done nothing to promote the sale of its
products in Oklahoma. 69
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the United States Supreme Court
adopted a two-tiered approach to test the constitutionality of asserting personal jurisdiction. 70 The first tier involved a determination of whether or not there were sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum jurisdiction. 7 1 If a court determined that minimum contacts existed, then the second tier of the analysis would
focus on the issues of " 'fair play and substantial justice.' "72
When confronted with such a circumstance, a court must balance
these factors in determining whether it is fair to subject a foreign
defendant to jurisdiction under a state's long-arm statute.7 3
In applying this analysis, the Court held that the state did
not have the necessary minimum contacts with the automobile
dealer and the distributor to assert personal jurisdiction.7 4 Since
Id. at 298. In addition, the Court opined that:
[t]here is no evidence of record that any automobiles distributed by
World-Wide are sold to retail customers outside [the New York] tristate
area. It is foreseeable that the purchasers of automobiles sold by
World-Wide and Seaway may take them to Oklahoma. But the mere
"unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
State."
Id. (citation omitted).
Justice Blackmun, however, argued in dissent that, because the automobile by
its nature is mobile, Oklahoma's jurisdiction was proper in that the retailer and
distributor could reasonably anticipate that the car would be in Oklahoma. Id. at
318 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). According to Justice Blackmun, "[t]o expect that
any new automobile will remain in the vicinity of its retail sale-like the 1914 electric driven car by the proverbial 'little old lady'-is to blink at reality." Id.
70 See id. at 291-92.
69

71

Id. at 291.

72

Id. at 292 (quoting InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316).

73 See id. The Court stated that the "relationship between the defendant and the

forum must be such that it is 'reasonable.. .to require the corporation to defend the
particular suit which is brought there.' " Id. (citation omitted). The Court added
that
[i]mplicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that
the burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an
appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors, including the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff's
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, at least when that
interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff's power to choose
the forum; the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
Id. (citations omitted).
74 Id. at 299. The Court summarized that "[i]n short, [the plaintiffs] seek to base
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insufficient contacts were found to exist, the Court concluded
that it was irrelevant to consider, for the purpose of a determination as toforum non conveniens, 7 5 whether or not the forum chosen
by the plaintiff would be a burden to the defendant. 7 6 The plaintiffs, however, had argued that it was entirely foreseeable for the
defendants to anticipate that an automobile purchased in one
state would inevitably be driven into another state. 7 This argument was rejected by the Court when it stated that foreseeability
did not equate to the "mere likelihood" that the car would be
driven in another state.78 Instead, the Court would require "that
the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.

' 71

Focusing on the issue of foreseeability, the Court held that
absent "affiliating circumstances,' '80 a state could not assert jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.8 ' The Court further held
that "[t]he forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due
Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with
the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the
forum State."'8 2 The Court therefore concluded that if a defendant purposefully avails itself of a national marketplace for its
products via either direct or indirect distribution methods, rather
than through an isolated occurrence or unilateral act by the dejurisdiction on one, isolated occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn
therefrom: the fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in New
York to New York residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing through
Oklahoma." Id. at 295 (emphasis added).
75 Forum non conveniens "refers to discretionary power of the court to decline jurisdiction when convenience of parties and ends ofjustice would be better served if
action were brought and tried in another forum." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 589
(5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted).
76 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294.
77 Id. at 295.
78 Id. at 297.
79 Id. (citations omitted).
80 Id. at 295. The Court noted that neither defendant carried on any
activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no sales and perform no
services there. They avail themselves of none of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. They solicit no business there either through
salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the
State. Nor does the record show that they regularly sell cars at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma customers or residents or that they indirectly,
through others, serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market.
Id.
81
82

Id.
Id. at 297-98 (citation omitted).

710

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:700

fendant, it must be made to answer13 claims in the foreign jurisdictions in which its goods are sold.
In New Jersey, development of the stream-of-commerce theory preceded the Supreme Court's landmark holding in WorldWide Volkswagen.84 The extension of personal jurisdiction over a
foreign manufacturer was first considered by the law division in
Certisimo v. Heidelberg Co. 5 In Certisimo, the plaintiff was injured
while using a printing press manufactured by Heidelberger
Druckmaschinen Aktiengessellschaft (HDAG), a West German
corporation.8 6 HDAG argued that it had "no contacts" with the
state of New Jersey,"7 and therefore, the complaint against it
should be dismissed because of "insufficiency of process. "88
Moreover, HDAG argued that it did not solicit business or advertise its products in the United States. ° Instead, the corporation
sold their products to an independent entity, Heidelberg Eastern, in West Germany, who then imported and sold the printing
press to the plaintiff's employer in the United States."0
In rendering its decision, the New Jersey court noted that
personal jurisdiction could be asserted, when a defendant volun83 Id. at 297, 299. The Court noted that when these factors are present, a corporation "has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the
risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on
to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the State."
Id. at 297.
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the stream-of-commerce theory. See
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985). In that case, the Court held
that it was "presumptively not unreasonable" to subject a foreign corporation conducting business in a forum and "avail[ing] [itself] of the privilege of conducting
business there "to the forum's jurisdiction." Id. at 2184. The Supreme Court further opined that "it may well be unfair to allow [the foreign corporation] to escape
having to account... for consequences that arise proximately from such activities;
the Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial shield to avoid
interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed." Id. at 2183.
84 Gendler, 102 N.J. at 477, 508 A.2d at 1136.
85 122 N.J. Super. 1, 298 A.2d 298 (Law Div. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Van Eeuwen v.
Heidelberg Eastern Inc., 124 N.J. Super. 251, 306 A.2d 79 (App. Div. 1973).
86 Id. at 4, 298 A.2d at 300. The plaintiff, Joseph Certisimo, claimed that he
injured his hands because the printing press "was 'negligently, carelessly and recklessly designed, constructed, manufactured, inspected and maintained.' " Id.
87 Id. at 3, 298 A.2d at 299 (emphasis in original).
88 Id. The plaintiff initially sued the distributor of the press, Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., a Delaware corporation. HDAG was brought into the suit as a third-party
defendant. Id.
89 Id. at 4, 298 A.2d at 300.
90 Id. HDAG claimed that Heidelberg Eastern was not its agent in this or any
transaction. In addition, HDAG stated, by affidavit, that it had no ownership or
financial interests, no control, and no supervision over Heidelberg Eastern's distribution policy. Id.
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tarily acted in a manner calculated to have a substantial connection and effect in the forum state. 9 ' The court reasoned that by
selling its products to Heidelberg Eastern, an American distributor, HDAG was deriving the economic benefits of the marketplace in the states where the product was distributed. 2 It was
therefore reasonable and foreseeable, the court asserted, that
HDAG would be subject to New Jersey jurisdiction when its
product caused injury in New Jersey.9 3 As a result, the court
opined that to bar an injured plaintiff from recovery because the
manufacturer used a middleman as a distributor was "to allow a
legal technicality to subvert justice and economic reality in the
would be subject to
worst sense."' 94 Thus, the court ruled HDAG
95
the jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts.
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey
examined the criteria for extending personal jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation shortly after the United States Supreme
Court's World-Wide Volkswagen decision. 9 6 In Coons v. American
Honda Motor Co., Ltd.," the plaintiff was severely burned when
the gas cap of his Honda;- motorcycle opened upon impact causing a fire. 98 The plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer,
Honda Motor Company Ltd. of Japan (Honda), a Japanese corporation, and its wholly-owned American distributor, American
Honda Motor Company (American Honda), a corporation au91 Id. at 7-8, 298 A.2d at 302.
92 See id. at 10, 298 A.2d at 303.
93 Id. at 14, 298 A.2d at 305.
94 Id. at 12, 298 A.2d at 305.
95 Id. at 14, 298 A.2d at 305. In rendering its decision, the Certisimo court relied
on Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961). See Certisimo, 122 N.J. Super. at 9-10, 298 A.2d at 302-03. In Gray, an
Ohio corporation manufactured a safety valve which was sold to an independent
corporation outside the state of Illinois and subsequently installed in a water
heater. Id. at 434, 176 N.E.2d at 762. Thereafter, the heater was sold to an Illinois
resident who incurred injuries when the heater exploded due to the safety valve's
apparent failure. Id. The plaintiff brought suit against the Ohio corporation in
Illinois. Id. In holding for the plaintiff, the Gray court ruled that "[w]here the alleged liability arises, as in this case, from the manufacture of products presumably
sold in contemplation for use here, it should not matter that the purchase was made
from an independent middleman or that someone other than the defendant
shipped the product into this State." Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
96 See Coons v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 176 N.J. Super. 575, 424 A.2d 446 (App.
Div. 1980), vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 996 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 94 N.J.
307, 463 A.2d 921 (1983), modified, 96 N.J. 419, 476 A.2d 763 (1984), cert. denied,
105 S.Ct. 808 (1985).
97 176 N.J. Super. 575, 424 A.2d 446 (App. Div. 1980).
98 Id. at 577, 424 A.2d at 447.
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thorized to conduct business in New Jersey.9 9 Honda claimed
that there was no basis for personal jurisdiction.' 0 0 The trial
court, however, reasoned, inter alia, that Honda had minimum
contacts with New Jersey, and therefore, the state could assert
personal jurisdiction over Honda.1 'O
The appellate division affirmed and held that where "the
manufacturer-distributor relationship is an active one and explicitly designed to provide and ensure the sale of the foreign corporation's products," the necessary minimum contacts requirement
was satisfied. 10 2 The court reached this decision based in part
upon the reasoning found in the Certisimo and World-Wide Volkswagen decisions; namely, the court was able to find sufficient contacts through the relationship between Honda and American
Honda.'0 ' The court determined that Honda could not entirely
insulate itself from lawsuits stemming from its negligently manufactured products by the use of a multi-level corporate distribution structure. 0 4 This reasoning was viewed by the court as
being in comport with the logical and persuasive dictum found in
the World-Wide Volkswagen decision. 0 5 The court therefore concluded that sufficient necessary minimum contacts were present
in the relationship between the codefendants for the court to assert personal jurisdiction over the parent corporation.'0 6
Six years after the appellate division adopted the stream of
commerce theory, the New Jersey Supreme Court, for the first
time, was faced with facts similar to those in Certisimo and
99 Id. Suit was filed four years, to the day, after the accident. See id. Both Honda

and American Honda filed motions for summary judgment, claiming the expiration
of the two-year statute of limitations. Id. In a separate opinion, the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of American Honda. Id. The trial court, however, denied Honda's motion for summary judgment and ruled "that the two-year
statute of limitations had been tolled by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-22 because Honda was a

foreign corporation that was not 'represented' in New Jersey by a person upon
whom process could be served."

Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 94

N.J. 307, 310, 463 A.2d 921, 922 (1983).
There was a series of appeals involving both Honda and American Honda following the appellate division's opinion. See Coons v. American Honda Motor Co.,
Inc., 96 N.J. 419, 421-22, 476 A.2d 763, 765 (1984) (detailing procedural history of
case).
100 Coons, 176 N.J. Super. at 577, 424 A.2d at 447.
101 Id. at 579-81, 424 A.2d at 448.
102 Id. at 580, 424 A.2d at 448.
103 Id. at 580-81, 424 A.2d at 448-49.
104 Id. at 581, 424 A.2d at 449.
105 Id. See also supra notes 64-83 and accompanying text (discussing World-Wide
Volkswagen).
106 Coons, 176 N.J. Super. at 581, 424 A.2d at 449.
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Coons.' 0 7 In Gendler, Justice Pollack, writing for a unanimous
court, began his analysis by discussing the constitutional requirements of personal jurisdiction set forth in the fourteenth amendment and prior case law.' 0 8 The Gendler court outlined the
traditional minimum contacts standards set forth by the Supreme
Court in InternationalShoe.'" 9 The court noted that the minimum
contacts requirement served to protect a foreign defendant from
unfair and unreasonable subjection to a forum state's long-arm
statute." 0 The court's primary concern in its minimum contacts
analysis was balancing the interests of the non-resident defendant's burden of defending the suit against the plaintiff's " 'interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief. . . .',,
The Gendler court also addressed the development of the
stream-of-commerce theory." 2 Contemplating the rise of international and interstate trade, the court viewed the stream-ofcommerce theory as a necessary means of expanding state jurisdiction over foreign corporations." 3 Thus, the court followed
the appellate and law divisions in adopting the stream-of-commerce theory." 4 Relying on Certisimo, the Gendler court ruled that
a manufacturer which penetrated a state's market would be subject to personal jurisdiction notwithstanding the role of independent intermediaries." 15 The court, therefore, opined that
regardless of the degree of control over the distribution system, a
manufacturer would be subject to personal jurisdiction if it had
See Gendler, 102 N.J. at 466-67, 508 A.2d at 1130.
108 See id.at 469, 508 A.2d at 1131.
109 Id. at 469-70, 508 A.2d at 1131-32. See also supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text (discussing InternationalShoe).
110 Gendler, 102 N.J. at 470, 508 A.2d at 1132 (citing InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at
317).
111 Id. at 472, 508 A.2d at 1133 (quoting W1orld-lWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
Additionally, the court recognized other significant factors, including the extent to
which the defendant conducted business in the forum state, as well as the forum
state's interest in adjudicating disputes involving its residents. Id. at 472-73, 508
A.2d at 1133. The court opined that a state's interests in subjecting a defendant to
its long-arm statute was directly proportional to the business activity in the state.
See id. at 472, 508 A.2d at 1133.
112 See id. at 474-78, 508 A.2d at 1134-36.
113 Id. at 474, 508 A.2d at 1134.
114 Id. at 476-77, 508 A.2d at 1135-36. The court noted that several other states
have incorporated the stream-of-commerce theory into their legislative statutes for
asserting jurisdiction over foreign defendants. Id. at 477, 508 A.2d at 1136.
115 Id. at 480, 508 A.2d at 1137. In its ruling, the court distinguished local retailers from major distributors and manufacturers. Id. at 477, 508 A.2d at 1136. Manufacturers usually initiate the distribution pyramid, thereby serving a larger market
in order to penetrate as many forums as possible, whereas the retailer's foreseeable
market area is "constrained." Id.
107
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actual or constructive knowledge of the means through which its
products were marketed.' 16 Accordingly, the court held that if a
manufacturer knows that its products are being marketed nationwide, it "should reasonably expect that those products would be
sold throughout the fifty states and that it will be subject to the
jurisdiction of every state."' 17
Based on the foregoing analysis, the court concluded that
because the case involved the sale of a Nippon product in New
Jersey, it "need not decide what minimum contacts would be required to satisfy the stream-of-commerce theory if plaintiff's
cause of action were [sic] unrelated to defendant's contacts with
the forum."'18 The court also noted that Nippon's contacts with
the state would allow New Jersey to exercise "specific jurisdiction" rather than "general jurisdiction."'9
Continuing its analysis, the Gendler court refuted Nippon's
assertion that the stream-of-commerce theory applies only to
cases involving personal injuries. 120 The court noted that while a
state has a greater interest in providing a forum to all residents
incurring personal injury, there was "no basis for allowing the
nature of the injury to preclude the application of the stream-ofcommerce theory."' 21 The court, therefore, ruled that a foreign
manufacturer causing only property damage or economic loss
122
would still be subject to the forum state's jurisdiction.
The Gendler court also addressed New Jersey's considerable
interest in serving as the forum in the present action.' 23 New
Jersey was the forum in which the plaintiff maintained its principal office, where the products were installed, and where witnesses were located. 124 Additionally, the court rejected Nippon's
proposal of New York as an alternative forum stating that New
116 Id.

at 480, 508 A.2d at 1137.

117 Id. at 481, 508 A.2d at 1138.

118 Id..at 482, 508 A.2d at 1138-39.
119 Id. 508 A.2d at 1138. The United States Supreme Court has defined "specific
jurisdiction" and "general jurisdiction". See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). Specific jurisdiction is found to exist "when a State
exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to
the defendant's contracts with the forum .. " Id. at 414 n.8 (citation omitted).
General jurisdiction is defined as a "State exercis[ing] personal jurisdiction over a
defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the
forum .
" I.
Id. at 414 n.9 (citation omitted).
120 Gendler, 102 N.J. at 482-83, 508 A.2d at 1139.
121 Id. at 483, 508 A.2d at 1139.
122
123
124

Id.
See id. at 483-84, 508 A.2d at 1139-40.
Id. at 484, 508 A.2d at 1140. In addition, Telecom, the installer of the tele-
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York was equally inconvenient to all the parties. 1 25 Moreover,
the court noted that the "only advantage that New York offers ' to
26
Nippon is that the present action is not pending in that state."'
The paucity of facts developed at the trial level, however,
elicited no evidence that Nippon had actual or constructive
knowledge of the means by which its products entered the forum
state. 12 7 The only evidence that was developed relating to the
stream-of-commerce theory was that Nippon "manufacture [d]
'telephone equipment for sale to companies throughout the
world.' "128 Thus, the court reversed the appellate division's determination that there was a sufficient basis for sustaining jurisdiction and remanded the matter to the law division for further
discovery.1 29 The facts necessary for determining the appropriateness ofjurisdiction on remand, according to the court, include
the degree of awareness Nippon had of its distribution system
and whether the transaction was an isolated or fortuitous act or
was the result of a formal system for distribution of Nippon's telephone systems. 130
Significantly, the Gendler ruling left unanswered the question
as to what degree of corporate activity constitutes actual or constructive awareness. Direction concerning the boundaries of corporate awareness will inevitably surface in future litigation,
whether in NewJersey or in other jurisdictions.13 1 While in Gendphone system, is also located in New Jersey and, although it was initially a defendant, could now be called upon as a potential witness. Id.
125 Id. The court noted that although Nippon suggested New York as an alternative forum-presumably because the contract stipulated that New York law would
control-that location would be equally inconvenient for Nippon as they are located in Japan. Id. But see supra note 29 (appellate division stating that "New Jersey
law would be likely to control").
126 Id.
127 Id. at 483, 484, 508 A.2d at 1139.
128 Id. at 483, 508 A.2d at 1139.
129
130

Id.

Id. at 483-84, 508 A.2d at 1139. Apparently, the supreme court inadvertently
overlooked its earlier statement that Nippon admitted, during oral argument, the
sale to Gendler was not an isolated transaction. See supra note 16.
131 Charles Gendler & Company and Nippon settled out of court on August 13,
1986 for $4,000. Interview with Stephen W. Gruhin, Esq., Gruhin & Gruhin, Belleville, New Jersey (Aug. 14, 1986).
The United States Supreme Court recently ruled that it would be unfair and
unreasonable for a California court to assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant who was aware that some of its products, placed into the stream-of-commerce, may possibly reach the forum state. Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior
Court of California, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987). In Asahi Vetal, a motorcyclist and his
passenger were involved in a collision with a tractor on a California highway. Id. at
1029. The motorcyclist brought suit in a product liability action against several
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ler the manufacturer used a wholly-owned subsidiary to distribute
its products, 132 future litigation may entail a more tenuous distribution chain. A manufacturer's awareness of the product's distribution chain, therefore, may be determined by the number of
middlemen, the size and scope of their operations, and the frequency with which the manufacturer conducts business with
them. The court, in holding that a manufacturer could not insulate itself behind an elaborate distribution chain,1 33 provides asparties, including the Taiwanese manufacturer of the motorcycle tire tube. Id. The
tire tube manufacturer filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnification against
Asahi Metal, the tube valve assembly manufacturer. Id. While the motorcyclist's
claims were settled with the parties, the indemnification action against Asahi Metal
remained. Id. at 1030. Asahi Metal, in seeking to quash service, contested California's assertion of personal jurisdiction. Id. On appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that, although Asahi Metal did not design or control the distribution
system that enabled its products to enter California, there was a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction because Asahi Metal's management was aware of the distribution methods and benefitted indirectly by the sales of products incorporating their components. Id. at 1031. In finding that such conduct satisfied the minimum contacts
test, the court also held that jurisdiction was "fair and reasonable given California's
interest in protecting its consumers .
Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior
Court of California, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 55, 702 P.2d 543, 553, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385, 396
(1985).
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Asahi Metal, 107 S. Ct. at 1035. In
an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court ruled that California's
assertion of personal jurisdiction over Asahi Metal violated the mandates of the due
process clause. Id. at 1032-33. The Court held that the burden placed on the defendant was severe while that imposed on the plaintiff and California was slight. Id.
at 1035. Therefore, the assertion of personal jurisdiction "would be unreasonable
and unfair." Id. TheJustices, however, were divided as to whether sufficient minimum contacts were established when a manufacturer places its products into the
stream-of-commerce with only the knowledge that it may or may not be swept into
the forum state. Compare id. at 1033 with id. at 1035 (Brennan,J., concurring in part
and in the judgment).
The New Jersey appellate division, however, recently held that the stream-ofcommerce theory was applicable when the only contact with the forum state was a
single sale. See Dave's Trash Removal v. Charm City Equip. Corp., 214 N.J. Super.
497, 502, 520 A. 2d 415, 418 (App. Div. 1987). The court further held that the
presence of the foreign manufacturer, whether corporate or individual, was not required in order for a state court to assert personal jurisdiction. Id. at 501, 520 A.
2d at 417. The court reasoned that the stream-of-commerce theory could be utilized irrespective of that stream being "only a trickle or even a drop." Id. at 502,
520 A. 2d at 418. In addition, the court ruled that a foreign manufacturer's assumed knowledge is sufficient for the forum state to assert personal jurisdiction. Id.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the Gendler holding that a foreign manufacturer
placing its products into the stream of commerce would be subject to personal jurisdiction " 'if the manufacturer knew or reasonably should have known' " that its
products would, through its distribution system, be used in the state. Id. at 502,
520 A. 2d at 417 (quoting Gendler, 102 N.J. at 480, 508 A. 2d at 1137).
132 Gendler, 102 N.J. at 467, 508 A.2d at 1130.
13 Id. at 479, 508 A.2d at 1137.
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surances that New Jersey would hold a manufacturer liable under
the stream-of-commerce theory whether or not it has control of
its product's distribution system."'
The Gendler decision enables New Jersey to assert the streamof-commerce theory as a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction
over a foreign manufacturer or distributor.' 35 Although the
lower New Jersey state courts had adopted the stream-of-commerce theory, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Gendler now provides a basis for consistency and predictability in
New Jersey litigation. Additionally, corporations who know or
should have known that they are penetrating the New Jersey marketplace now have clear notice of their availability to suit in this
3
forum. 1

6

The New Jersey Supreme Court's acceptance of the streamof-commerce theory came several years after the New Jersey
lower courts and the United States Supreme Court adopted the
theory. 13 7 The Gendler decision, however, is more than a belated
adoption of the stream-of-commerce theory. In World-Wide Volkswagen and the New Jersey cases, Certisimo and Coons, the plaintiffs
were individuals who suffered personal injuries. The Gendler
court, however, was confronted with a corporation incurring a
purely economic loss.

138

In extending the scope of the stream-

of-commerce theory beyond personal injury, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has affirmed its traditional belief that economic
1 39
loss in most cases can be as devastating as personal injury.
Therefore, the Gendler decision establishes New Jersey's interest
134 Id. at 480-81, 508 A.2d at 1138 ("control of [the distribution] system is not
necessary to subject the manufacturer to the jurisdiction of the forum state").
1"35 Id. at 477, 508 A.2d at 1136. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-411(c)(3)
(West 1960 & Supp. 1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.-080(1) (Michie 1986); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a)(3) (1982); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322(a)(1)(iii) (Purdon 1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803(1)(h) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
136 Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (requiring "that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws.") (citation omitted).
137 See supra notes 64-106 and accompanying text (discussing iVorld-IVide Volkswagen, Certisimo, and Coons).
138 Gendler, 102 N.J. at 482, 508 A.2d at 1139.
139 See, e.g., Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965); see also Note, Commercial Entity Limited to Breach of Warranty Theory for Recovery
of Economic Losses, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 401, 411-12 (1987).
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in protecting its citizens from actions by foreign corporations regardless of the nature of the injury.
Kate Lommel Ciravolo

